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This paper surveys the legal tradition that links Magna Carta with the modern con-
cepts of the rule of law and the limits on government. It documents that the original
understanding of the rule of law included substantive commitments to individual freedom
and limited government. Then, it attempts at explaining how and why such commitments
were lost to a formalist interpretation of the rule of law from 1848 to 1939. The paper
concludes by arguing how a revival of the substantive commitments of the rule of law is
central in a project of reshaping modern states.
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Such is the subject matter of legal history in the middle ages where we can follow
the rise and progress of law and the rule of law... It was mediaevalists in England,
armed with Bracton and the Year Books, who ended Stuart statecraft, and the
Constitution of the United States was written by men who had Magna Carta and
Coke upon Littleton before their eyes. Could anything be more mediaeval than the
idea of due process, or the insertion in an instrument of government of a contract
clause? Pacta sunt servanda, it seems to say, with the real mediaeval accent.
Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
1 Introduction
Reading Magna Carta is a disconcerting experience. Instead of an eloquent expression of
natural rights, such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence, or a well-organized template
for institutional design, such as the U.S. Constitution, Magna Carta is an archetypical legal
document from the Middle Ages. The language, even when translated from Latin into 21st
century English, is unfamiliar. The chapters (the numbering of which was a later introduction
to ease reading) cluster without a pattern, more the product of the haste with which this
3,550-word sheet of parchment was drafted than of serene reflection.1 Most of the chapters,
in addition, deal with feudal matters of little relevance to anyone except antiquarians. Other
chapters, such as those dealing with the Jews, are oensive to contemporary sensibilities. After
this reading, it is dicult not to agree with generations of historians who have conceptualized
the Great Charter as a lieu de me´moire, an ideological construction that sustains the collective
beliefs of the English-speaking peoples in life, liberty, and property, instead of thinking about
it as a relevant legal document.
And yet, a perceptive reader cannot but marvel at Magna Carta. Beyond the disappoint-
ments of looking at the real England of the early 13th century instead of at the Hollywood
recreation we have grown accustomed to, one finds in it the foundations of the “rule of law.”
1 Vincent (2012) provides a concise, yet insightful treatment of Magna Carta, the coronation charters that
preceded it, and Magna Carta’s later role in English history. J. C. Holt’s (1965)Magna Carta is, nevertheless,
still the classic reference.
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As in all permanent texts, the brilliance of Magna Carta shines even more brightly thanks to
all its shortcomings.
Let us look, for example, at chapter 17:2
(17) Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be held in
a fixed place.
This chapter sets up a concise and clear procedural rule: the adjudication of legal disputes
cannot occur wherever the King’s whim may drive him, but will take place in a predetermined
location. What hope of a successful resolution of disputes can we have if we do not even know
where they will be adjudicated?
Or what about chapters 30 to 32 and their protection of property rights?
(30) No sheri, royal ocial, or other person shall take horses or carts for transport
from any free man, without his consent.
(31) Neither we nor any royal ocial will take wood for our castle, or for any other
purpose, without the consent of the owner.
(32) We will not keep the lands of people convicted of felony in our hand for longer
than a year and a day, after which they shall be returned to the lords of the ’fees’
concerned.
These four chapters are the kernel of legal doctrines of a more general nature. One does
not need to be an inventive English barrister to argue that, by analogy with chapter 17, if
ordinary lawsuits should be heard in a fixed place, the other rules that govern a judicial process
should also be predetermined. For chapter 17 is not defending the supremacy of a concrete
physical location (in itself an issue of minor importance), but is an understanding of how an
adjudication should proceed according to the principles of natural reason. Indeed, this point is
reinforced by chapters 19 and 40 regarding due process and a prompt trial. Similarly, chapters
30 and 31 of Magna Carta explicitly mention horses, carts, and wood because they were the
most valuable pieces of movable property at the time for a median free man. But the general
2 http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation
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principle of respect for property rights, the goal of the Barons in Runnymede, should apply to
all movable and immovable property. Historical experience suggests that, once we have ensured
the combination of due process and the protection of property rights, the rest of the “rule of
law” and, with it, a system of well-ordered liberty, follows.
But what is exactly the “rule of law”? This question is pertinent because, while jurists
and politicians nearly unanimously praise this legal principle as a prerequisite for democracy
and prosperity, scholars vehemently disagree about the actual content of this rule. As German
lawyers love to say, law is full of indeterminate legal concepts (unbestimmte Rechtsbegri ). And
few concepts seem more indeterminate than the “rule of law.”
2 The Interpretations of the Rule of Law
A thin interpretation states that the “rule of law” is a technical construction limited to
formal conditions without material content. This formalist position is, perhaps, the one held
most extensively among contemporary legal scholars (in particular, among those educated in
the analytic tradition). Formal requirements (for instance, norms should be clear, prospective,
and non-contradictory) are valuable because they allow the law to guide the behavior of the
members of society. A lapidary consequence of this view is oered by Raz (1979):
The law may, for example, institute slavery without violating the rule of law.
A thick interpretation of the “rule of law” adds to the formal conditions of the thin
interpretation a number of substantive commitments, in particular, the respect for individual
liberties.3 As a recent example, in his best-selling book, Bingham (2010) lists the “adequate
protection of fundamental human rights” as the fifth of the requirements of the “rule of law”
and explicitly rejects the formalist constraints of the thin interpretation.
There are, as well, a full range of intermediate positions, such as Lon Fuller’s celebrated
eight criteria for legality (Fuller, 1969). Some of those criteria (for instance, the interdiction of
3 The thin vs. thick interpretation classification is used by Tamanaha (2004) in a summary of the academic
literature on the “rule of law.” The taxonomy has become popular among scholars.
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unstable legislation) go beyond a minimalist formalism and introduce some limited substantive
elements.
In the rest of the paper, I will engage, first, in an archaeology of knowledge to demonstrate
that the original understanding of the “rule of law” was the thick interpretation presented
above. Second, I will show that there is a clear path linking Magna Carta with the modern
thick interpretation of the “rule of law.” And third, I will defend the thesis that restoring such
an interpretation is key to rebuilding limited government in modern societies.
3 On the Origins of the Concept of the Rule of Law
The origins of the expression “rule of law” in English are uncertain.4 The first recorded use of
the expression that the Oxford English Dictionary can find is by John Blount. Around 1500,
Blount, a kinsman of William Blount, 4th Baron Mountjoy and a fellow at All Souls College,
Oxford, translated into English some selected portions of Nicholas Upton’s De Studio Militari
(a forgettable 1447 treatise on heraldry and the military). Blount rendered the Latin Juris
regula as (using the spelling of his time) the Rewle of lawe.5
Not only did the expression soon become common, but it acquired a role in rhetorical
arguments defending the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of an exercise of power. In his Declaration
of August 12, 1642, to All His Loving Subjects, a few days before raising his standard at
Nottingham, the unfortunate Charles I argued that:6
The inconveniences and mischiefs which had grown by the long intermission of Par-
liaments, and by departing too much from the known Rule of Law, to an Arbitrary
power.
4 There is an alternative, although related, use of the same expression that comes from Roman and Canon
Law. In particular, medieval Canon Law incorporated principles of legal interpretation called Regulae Juris,
or “rules of law” (11 in the Decretals of Gregory IX and 88 in the Liber Sextus Decretalium by Boniface
VIII; the latter still has applicability in contemporary Canon Law and is an outstanding read).
5 The full passage reads: Lawes And constitutcions be ordeyned be cause the noysome Appetit of man maye
be kepte vnder the Rewle of lawe by the wiche mankinde ys dewly enformed to lyue honestly, OED Third
Edition, March 2011.




But despite these older uses, the expression “rule of law” only became widely popular after
A.V. Dicey (1835-1922) postulated in his classic 1885 treatise, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution, chapter IV, pp. 145-146, that:
Two features have at all times since the Norman Conquest characterised the political
institutions of England.
The first of these features is the omnipotence or undisputed supremacy throughout
the whole country of the central government...
The second of these features, which is closely connected with the first, is the rule or
supremacy of law.
Generations of law students in the English-speaking world studied Dicey’s treatise and
became so acquainted with these words that the adherence to the idea of the “rule of law”
became a badge of professional competence.7
But what was the “rule of law” for Dicey? On page 146, the Oxford scholar explains:
This supremacy of the law, or the security given under the English constitution to
the rights of individuals looked at from various points of view, forms the subject of
this part of this treatise.
That is, the “rule of law,” by its very definition, was embodied in a number of English
liberties. For Dicey, the law in rule of law was the common law and its protection of individual
freedoms.
This substantive understanding of the “rule of law” is often forgotten because Dicey himself
added later in the very same chapter IV three concrete contents of the “rule of law”: due
process, equality under the law, and case law-based protection of liberties (pp. 179-187). While
these three interrelated concepts may seem to be, at first sight, procedural mechanisms that
push us toward a formalist reading, they must be interpreted instrumentally for several reasons.
7 There were, nevertheless, discontents. More famously, John Grith (1918-2010) and his students at the
London School of Economics remained unconvinced. Grith suspected that, beyond basic formal procedures,
the “rule of law” was nothing but a thin veil to hide the inequities of class domination. See Loughlin (2010).
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First, because it is otherwise hard to understand the structure of Dicey’s treatise. For
instance, part II of the book under the rubric “The Rule of Law,” groups the chapters on the
right to personal freedom or the freedom of discussion. Second, because Dicey was a fervent
Whig. The product of several generations of Clapham Sect members and radical publishers,
Dicey could barely conceive any other political position except that of a solid Liberal Unionist.8
A common law without English liberties was no common law for Dicey. Due process, equality,
and judges were just the means to defend those freedoms. Third, we have Dicey’s rather
low regard of French administrative law. French administrative legal regulations were more
often than not beautiful examples of well-crafted norms that neatly complied with all formalist
requirements: transparent, unequivocal, elegant, the products of a rich tradition of superb civil
servants. And yet, Dicey vehemently denied that droit administratif could achieve the “rule of
law.”
But Dicey was not inventing new ideas.9 Instead, his understanding of the “rule of law”
follows a tradition where Magna Carta stands as a fundamental milestone. In the next section,
I will stop three times in the voyage from Magna Carta to Dicey. With only three stations,
my description will have more gaps than content. I will forget classical legal thought.10 I will
forget, as well, about the legal tradition outside the English-speaking world (and there they go,
with the stroke of a digital pen, from Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Treatise on Law to Montesquieu’s
De l’esprit des lois, passing through the School of Salamanca and Hugo Grotius).11 My three
8 This point was well understood by John Grith, whom we introduced in footnote 7. As he put it during
the Seventh Chorley Lecture at the London School of Economics, the “rule of law” was “a fantasy invented
by Liberals of the old school in the late-19th century and patented by the Tories to throw a protective
sanctity around certain legal and political institutions and principles which they wish to preserve at any
cost” (Grith, 1979). One may disagree with Grith’s judgment of the consequences for human welfare of
the “rule of law,” but he is on the money in terms of recognizing the inherent substantive commitments of
Dicey’s conception of the “rule of law.”
9 Dicey, for example, mentions W.E. Hearn’s 1867 textbook The Government of England as a key inspiration
for his own work and of the idea of the “rule of law” (see Arndt, 1957). Also, he wrote to his old friend James
Bryce (later the British Ambassador to the U.S. and a key actor in laying the foundations of the special
relation between the two nations that would shape so much of the 20th century) that his book “contains
some things (very few I own) which it were absurd to call original but which I think have been hardly said
expressly before” (cited by Cosgrove, 1980, p. 68).
10 There was a not-so-remote time, before the atrocities committed in the name of modern pedagogy replaced
actual knowledge with banal self-indulgence, when a lawyer was supposed to have read Aristotle’s Politics
and Cicero’s On the Laws or, at the very least, to pretend he had.
11 Nothing further from my intention than to imply any peculiarities of the English. As Vincent (2012) wittily
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stops are selected as illustrations of the argument, even if that means leaving behind some more
familiar names such as John Fortescue (c.1394-c.1480) or Michael Oakeshott or notable events
such as the Bill of Rights of 1689 or Entick v. Carrington. The usual flimsy excuse of space
constraints can be here vindicated with fairness: it would require an inordinate amount of pages
(and an expertise I sorely lack) to deal, even perfunctorily, with the ignored topics.
4 From 1215 to 1885: Seven Centuries of Tradition
Since at least Roman times, western jurists have conceived of law as well-ordered reason aimed at
the common good. While the details of law could change over time, as circumstances evolved and
experience accumulated, the essence of legal systems (the naturalis ratio that Gaius talks about
at the start of his Institutes) was permanent. A norm that does not respect those principles
cannot be law and, therefore, there cannot be the “rule of law.” This idea has resurfaced many
times.
4.1 Henry de Bracton
Our first port of call is Henry de Bracton (c.1210-c.1268), who wrote just a few years after
Magna Carta. In his famous On the Laws and Customs of England (in Latin, De Legibus
et Consuetudinibus Angliae), Bracton called the great charter constitutionem libertatis, the
constitution of liberty.12.
It is hard to exaggerate Bracton’s influence on medieval English law or on the reception of
Roman law concepts in Great Britain. Bracton displayed a sophisticated understanding of the
“rule of law.” First, he contends that the king is subject directly to the law, for law makes him
king, and indirectly to his earls and barons, who check his power:
The king has a superior, namely, God. Also the law by which he is made king.
Also his curia, namely, the earls and barons, because if he is without bridle, that is
without law, they ought to put the bridle on him.13
remarks about the success of Magna Carta under Henry III, “England’s liberties were won from a nine
year-old Angevin king, provoked by a French invasion, and confirmed under the seal of an Italian cardinal.”
12 Volume 3, p. 35, available at http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/
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Second, Bracton states that this sovereignty of the law interdicts arbitrariness:
for there is no rex where will rules rather than lex.14
Two points are fundamental to interpreting Bracton. First, for Bracton, the sentence at
the start of the first quote (The king has a superior, namely, God) is not a mere concession
to the religious predispositions of his time. An invocation to a deity was a call to natural
law, with its rich tapestry of moral and ecacy requisites that territorial rulers were bound to
respect.15 Second, for the jurist in the Middle Ages, law was found, not created. Rules could
compile it, clarify it, publish it. Judges could adapt it to new circumstances. Legal scholars
could explore its implications. But none of them could create law and, much less, eliminate its
moral constraints. The law’s “bridle” was, for Bracton, much more a constraint than any of us,
educated in a world of hyperactive legislatures and a positivist Zeitgeist, can appreciate (this
is a point made both by Hayek, 2011, and by Reid, 2004).
4.2 Sir Edward Coke
Our second stop on the path fromMagna Carta to Dicey is Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). Coke,
baptized by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty as “the great fountain of Whig principles,”
transformed Magna Carta into the cornerstone of the reassertion of the power of the English
Parliament against the Stuart dynasty. Coke, with little regard for historical accuracy, con-
sidered Magna Carta an authoritative declaratory document of immemorial English liberties
and reinterpreted much of its content. For example, in 1604, Coke found in chapter 39 of the
original Magna Carta a justification for habeas corpus.16
13 Volume 2, p. 110. I cannot resist quoting the original Latin, which has a poetic rhythm lacking in the
translation: legem per quam factus est rex.
14 Volume 2, p. 33
15 In an erudite work, Helmholz (2015) has documented the importance of natural law from the Middle Ages
onward both in the training of lawyers and in the court. See, for example, Lord Mansfield’s (1705-1793)
reasoning in Somerset v. Stewart (1772).
16 Chapter 39 of the original version of the charter, still in the Statute books of the United Kingdom, lays down
a surprisingly contemporary view of due process: “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed
with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of
the land.”
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Coke deftly articulated his idea of the substantive commitments of the “rule of law”in 1610.
In the decision of Dr. Bonham’s case, Coke argued:
for when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will control it, and adjudge such
Act to be void.
Dr. Bonham’s case is, like the concept of the “rule of law,” often interpreted from a formalist
position. The main argument for Coke’s dismissal of the Act of Parliament that empowered
the Royal College of Physicians to prosecute Dr. Bonham was the old maxim that nemo judex
in parte sua: the College could not be both a judge and a party in deciding the fate of Dr.
Bonham.
But the interesting part of Coke’s decision is that he never limits his wording to this formal
requirement. Indeed, Coke makes a much stronger claim (which he later repeated in other cases):
a statute could satisfy all formal requirements (i.e., been approved by Parliament following
procedure) and yet, by violating the principles implied by “common right and reason,” it would
be 1) subject to the common law and, thus, 2) void. Even if Coke does not use the expression
“rule of law,” his understanding of it was thick. More importantly, generations of lawyers in
England and North America learned the substance of this idea (although not the expression)
from him.17
4.3 The American Founding
The last station on our trip is the American Founding. The discussion about how the role of
the “rule of law” has shaped our national adventure could fill several volumes. Having been
educated in a legal system that separates its Kelsian Constitutional Court from the regular
17 Innumerable words have been written about Coke in general and about the Dr. Bonham case in particular.
Not all, by far, agree with my interpretation. But the real importance of Dr. Bonham’s case, like that of
Magna Carta, is less about what Coke meant and more about how generations of thinkers read the case. And
there is little doubt that, for centuries, the Dr. Bonham case was a fundamental piece in the construction
of the classical liberal understanding of the “rule of law” (Stoner, 1992). For example, George Mason cited
the Dr. Bonham case in Robin et al. v. Hardaway et al. to defend the freedom of some slaves since: “Now
all acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the
nature of things, considered as void.” John Marshall was familiar with Robin et al. v. Hardaway et al. and
other cases in colonial Virginia that hinted at the idea of constitutional judicial review.
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jurisdiction, I have, for example, spent an inordinate amount of time thinking about Marbury
v. Madison, the origins of judicial review, its role with the concept of the “rule of law,” and its
impact across the world.
In that thinking, I have reached the conclusion that, instead of glossing yet one more time
Marshall’s words or fighting another battle about Article III of the Constitution, one can profit
much from going to the earlier colonial times that framed the actions of Marshall and his
contemporaries.
And right at the start of those colonial times, Nathaniel Ward (1578-1652), a pastor and a
former barrister, compiled the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, adopted by the Massachusetts
General Court in 1641.18 The document starts with:
The free fruition of such liberties Immunities and priveledges as humanitie, Civilitie,
and Christianitie call for as due to every man in his place and proportion without
impeachment and Infringement hath ever bene and ever will be the tranquillitie and
Stabilitie of Churches and Commonwealths.
It is not an accident that these words remind us of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before its
evisceration in the Slaughter-House Cases, the expression “privileges or immunities” had a
material content in the public understanding.19
The first liberty is a concise rephrasing of clauses 30, 31, and 39 of Magna Carta:
No mans life shall be taken away, no mans honour or good name shall be stayned,
no mans person shall be arested, restrayned, banished, dismembred, nor any wayes
punished, no man shall be deprived of his wife or children, no mans goods or estaite
shall be taken away from him, nor any way indammaged under colour of law or
Countenance of Authoritie, unlesse it be by vertue or equitie of some expresse law
18 Similar statues were approved in Maryland (1639) and West New Jersey (1676). In my own colony, Penn-
sylvania, William Penn ordered in 1687 the first printing of the whole text of Magna Carta in the Americas.
19 See Lash (2014) for details on the Fourteenth Amendment and Labbe and Lurie (2005) for the Slaughter-
House Cases. The use of the idea of the substantive due process to get around the worst implications of
the Slaughter-House Cases decision illustrates the tension inherent in a thin interpretation of the “rule of
law.” In practice, many supporters of such an interpretation are forced to reintroduce material commitments
through fanciful concepts such as substantive due process.
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of the Country waranting the same, established by a generall Court and suciently
published, or in case of the defect of a law in any parteculer case by the word of God.
And in Capitall cases, or in cases concerning dismembring or banishment according
to that word to be judged by the Generall Court.
The second liberty lays out a general principle of equality in front of the law:
Every person within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall enjoy
the same justice and law, that is generall for the plantation, which we constitute
and execute one towards another without partialitie or delay.
And the ninth liberty protects economic freedom:
No monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions
that are profitable to the Countrie, and that for a short time.
Note the words for a “short time,” an idea the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1988 has
missed.
The road from the Massachusetts Body of Liberties to the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and Marhsall’s tenure was long and tortuous, but it was open
from the first day English colonists settled in Massachusetts Bay. Magna Carta, Bracton, and
Coke had started it all.20
5 Rule of Law v. Rule by Norms
An implication of the legal inheritance I just described is the distinction between the “rule of
law” and “rule by norms.”21 “Rule by norm” is an imperative of any modern government, in-
cluding dictatorships. The sophistication of contemporary life and the complexities of advanced
20 The classic reference for the influence of Magna Carta in North America is still Dick Howard (1968). See
Reid (2004) for the understanding of the “rule of law” in the 17th and 18th centuries in the English-speaking
world and Pallitto (2015) for the impact of Magna Carta on case law.
21 Often, “rule of law” is opposed to “rule by law”(see, for instance, Tamanaha, 2004, p. 92, and also Ginsburg
and Moustafa, 2008). I find the latter expression less useful than “rule by norms,” Besides being phonetically
easier to distinguish from “rule of law,” one could possibly imagine a society governed by rules that do not
satisfy Fuller’s criteria for legality and, yet, can easily be construed as a nation ruled by norms.
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technology make it impossible to eciently run a large organization without norms that satisfy
at least several of the formalist requirements of the thin interpretation of the “rule of law”
(clarity, non-contradiction, etc.).
An example of my assertion is Franco’s Spain starting in the late 1950s. The pressures of
modernization and the need to achieve a modicum of legitimacy through economic growth forced
the construction, under the auspices of Lo´pez Rodo´ -a well-regarded professor of administrative
law- of a technically sharp administrative state.22 Clear procedures were laid down and followed.
Civil servants were selected largely on merit. Norms were public, expertly crafted, prospective,
and unambiguous.23 And yet, nothing vaguely resembling the “rule of law” existed in 1960s
Spain.
An example of what happens when formal requirements are not followed is Germany between
1933 and 1945. Historians have documented how dysfunctional the national-socialist state was.
Standard administrative rules were replaced by delphic principles such as “working towards the
Fu¨hrer.” By 1938, the German state was a systemless polycracy: party against state, Wehrma-
cht against SS, ministry against agency (see Broszat, 1981, and Kershaw, 1993). The resulting
administrative chaos seriously handicapped Germany’s war performance and accelerated the
demise of the regime.24
6 The Rise of the Thin Interpretation
But i) if the thick interpretation of the rule of law is the product of the illustrious tradition
presented in section 4 and ii) we have expressions to deal with the pure formalist content of
the “rule of law” such as “rule by norms,” why is the thin interpretation of the “rule of law”
so popular nowadays? Two reasons are key.
22 The cornerstone of such reform, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1958 (Ley de 17 de julio de 1958, de
Procedimiento Administrativo) was so influential that small portions of it are still in the Spanish statute
books 40 years after the end of Franco’s regime.
23 During the first two decades of the dictatorship, many statutes and regulations were kept secret. Vin˜as
(2014) reports the last secret statute he has been able to track down is from 1957.
24 See, for example, O’Brien, 2015, for a description of Germany’s mistakes in resources allocation during the
war due to mismanagement.
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6.1 The British Constitution v. the English Constitution
The British constitution of 1776 was not the English constitution of Coke. Instead of the
complex system of interlocking checks and balances between the one (the King), the few (the
Lords), and the many (the Commons) tempered by the common law, custom, and practices,
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the subsequent Whig predominance had produced an ag-
gressive and powerful House of Commons. When Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) insisted
on parliamentary sovereignty, he was merely stating a fact, perhaps more forcefully than his
predecessors, but not breaking new ground.25 When Commentaries on the Laws of England
was published in North America, perceptive colonial lawyers understood that unlimited par-
liamentary sovereignty was a mortal threat to colonial liberties and self-government (Zweiben,
1990). Even if the problem of sending representatives across the Atlantic Ocean could some-
how be managed, the small population of the colonies relative to that of England meant that
the British Parliament could rule them without regard to their interests (as it often did with
Scotland and Wales, despite the presence in London of members of Parliament from those two
nations).
This problem was not theoretical. After 1763, the British Parliament’s attempts at asserting
its authority in the colonies were met with increasing resistance. Local leaders reacted by
claiming their allegiance to the King, as a bulwark against Parliament (a point made by Nelson,
2014, who goes as far as calling the revolt a “royalist revolution”). Constitutionally speaking,
no oense was bigger than the Declaratory Act of 1766 (ocially, the American Colonies Act).
It was only after the realization that George III was not the counterbalancing force that colonial
elites had hoped for, that independence became an ineluctable choice.26
25 Sovereignty goes beyond supremacy. While the later only implies predominance over other powers, the former
brings domination over them. Sovereignty is indivisible and, ultimately, unshareable, as the colonials would
slowly realize from 1765 to 1776. The move from parliamentary supremacy to parliamentary sovereignty
is one of the key steps in the constitutional evolution of the 17th century United Kingdom. Parliamentary
sovereignty was defended by the winners of 1688 and opposed both by Tory monarchists such as the Viscount
Bolingbroke, who defended the King’s traditional prerogatives, and by radicals such as John Wilkes, who
feared the unbridled power of an oligarchy-controlled Parliament.
26 Perhaps this explains the vitriolic denunciation of George III in the Declaration of Independence, clearly out
of proportion to any fault of the British king, and the absence of any reference to the Parliament (except an
elliptic naming of “others”). Since the colonials did not recognize their links to Westminster, they did not
have to “declare the causes which impel them to the separation” with respect it.
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But once independence had been achieved and a Congress elected by the people regularly met
in Washington, the old concerns about the unrestricted power of a legislature were forgotten.
Instead, students of law were attracted to Blackstone’s work, undoubtedly the best existing
exposition of the common law,27 or to treatises heavily influenced by it (such as James Kent’s
1826 Commentaries on American Law). Imperceptibly, the idea of a sovereign legislator, where
Westminster was all too easily replaced by Capitol Hill, took hold: the “rule of law” could not
be anything more than the rule of statutes approved by Congress, regardless of their material
content.28
6.2 From a Kantian Rechtsstaat to a Positivist Rechtsstaat
The second reason for the popularity of the thin interpretation of the rule of law comes from
Germany and its large influence on legal and political thought of the entire western world
between 1815 and 1933.
In the German-speaking world, a cousin of the “rule of law” had been born: the Rechtsstaat,
the “state of law,” but more accurately translated as the “constitutional state” (see Heuschling,
2002, for a comparison of the idea of the “rule of law” and of the Rechtsstaat, and Barber, 2010,
for a defense of the concept within contemporary legal theory). The word Rechtsstaat was
a neologism coined in 1798 by J.W. Petersen (1758-1815).29 The term was popularized by
Carl Theodor Welcker (1790-1869) and, in particular, by Robert von Mohl (1799-1875) in his
1844 treatise The Political Science according to the Principles of the Constitutional State (my
translation, in German: Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsa¨tzen des Rechtsstaates).
For its proponents, the Rechtsstaat was a Kantian ideal: a commonwealth of free citizens
guided by reason. The respect for fundamental rights and for republican self-government was
inherent in the idea of the Rechtsstaat. When, in 1883, in a letter to one of his ministers, Otto
27 As Abraham Lincoln put it: “[I] never read anything which so profoundly interested and thrilled me.” Quoted
in Ogden (1932), p. 328.
28 In the United Kingdom, parliamentary sovereignty was the background behind Jeremy Bentham’s and John
Austin’s development of the view of the law as a command issued by the sovereign regardless of any substan-
tive content. Perhaps this explains why the thin interpretation of the “rule of law” became the dominant
one among analytic legal theorists.
29 Petersen wrote under the pseudonym Placidus in his 1798 work Literature on the Theory of State (Litteratur
der Staatslehre).
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von Bismarck disparaged the whole idea of the Rechtsstaat, the Iron Chancellor understood
what he was dealing with (Heuschling, 2002, p. 6).
But Bismarck could have saved his energy. Mirroring the declining fortunes of the rest of
German classical liberalism after 1848 (when, as A.J.P. Taylor, 1945, famously said, “German
history reached its turning-point and failed to turn”), the original conception of the Rechtsstaat
began to mutate into a formalistic essence. The process started with Friedrich Julius Stalh
(1802-1861) and continued with Otto Ba¨hr (1817-1895), Otto Mayer (1846-1924), and Georg
Jellinek (1851-1911). The metamorphosis was completed with the research agenda of the pure
theory of law (Reine Rechtslehre) of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). For this generation of German
jurists, the Rechtsstaat was just well-organized administrative law. Kelsen argued that any
substantive commitment of the rule of law was a fanciful chimera, for “just as everything King
Midas touched turned into gold, everything to which law refers becomes law...” (Kelsen 1967, p.
161).30 There is no more overwhelming evidence of how high the tide of the positivist tradition
reached than Hayek’s endorsement of a formalist understanding of the “rule of law” in part II
of the The Constitution of Liberty.
6.3 The Progressive Movement, Wilson, and the Rule of Law
Woodrow Wilson forcefully combined these two intellectual developments: the sovereignty of
the legislature and administrative law as the only content of the “rule of law.” Before becom-
ing the 28th president, Wilson wrote Congressional Government (1885), a book that praised
British parliamentary sovereignty as a superior alternative to the checks and balances of our
Constitution. In other words, Wilson wanted to abandon the ideas behind the English con-
stitution of the 17th century for which the Revolutionary war had been fought in favor of the
ideas of the British constitution of the 18th century, which had been defeated at Yorktown.
Simultaneously, Wilson pushed for the construction of an administrative state explicitly based
30 This strict formalism reached sub-realistic tones with expressions such as the “national-socialist German
constitutional state” (Nationalsozialistischer deutscher Rechtsstaat) or the “German constitutional state
Adolf Hitler” (deutsche Rechtsstaat Adolf Hitlers) used between 1933-1945 by jurists such as Hans Frank
and Carl Schmitt. Once the substantive commitments of the Rechtsstaat were eliminated, Frank and Schmitt
did not find it particularly troublesome to eliminate the formal commitments, as well. All that was left was
adherence to the desires of the leader.
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on the Prussian template (Hamburger, 2014). Wilson represented the powerful intellectual force
of progressivism and modern social science that facilitated the takeover of the the “rule of law”
by thin interpretations.
And those thin interpretations helped to open the doors to the modern administrative state
and to the constitutional revolution of 1937. Starting in the 1920s and culminating with the
New Deal, basic economic freedoms were severely curtailed even while formal requirements
(such as due process) were largely still enforced (Ernst, 2014).
7 Rebuilding the Limits to Government
The experience of the U.S. and Western Europe over the last century teaches us that the restora-
tion of limited government in the 21st century demands a recovery of our original understanding
of the “rule of law.” Milder versions of the rule of law are not sucient for the task of controlling
government. For instance, without full property rights and liberty of contracts, government will
increasingly meddle with the economy and endanger our prosperity.
The poor performance of advanced economies in terms of productivity growth over the last
15 years is a warning that economic growth is not automatic. Any economist would recognize
that many factors are behind this poor performance, from aging of the population to misguided
fiscal and monetary policies. However, the increased uncertainty about regulation and the
overreaching expansion of the administrative state are a considerable dragging force. As a
revealing anecdote, the Minnesota state government has decided, in its infinite wisdom, that
interior decorators need a license.31
An example of the potential benefits from restoring this thick understanding comes, para-
doxically, from Germany, the intellectual source of many of our current problems. After the
trauma of 1945, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz ) and its
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) embraced a much thicker concept of
the “rule of law.”32
31 According to Kleiner and Krueger (2013), 35 percent of employees in the U.S. are now either licensed or
certified by the government. Having lived 5 years in Minneapolis, I can testify that civilized decorating
trends have made only minor inroads in the Upper Midwest. I fail, however, to see why it should be the role
of the government to protect sturdy Minnesotans from poor color pairings in their living rooms.
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Perhaps the most renown part of that understanding is Article 79(3) of the Grundgesetz,
which establishes an eternity clause (Ewigkeitsklausel) limiting the substantive content of the
changes to the norm:33
Amendments to this Basic Law aecting the division of the Federation into La¨nder,
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down
in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.
For our exposition, the relevant words are the eternal protection of the principles of Article
1 (human dignity, human rights, and the legally binding force of basic rights) and Article 20
(democracy, the federal structure of the state, people’s sovereignty, right of resistance, and the
protection of the natural foundations of life and animals).34 This eternity clause was created
to avoid paths to dictatorship that respected the formal requirements of the “rule of law,” an
event that Germany had witnessed with the passing of the Enabling Act (Erma¨chtigungsgesetz )
on March 24, 1933.
But despite the fame of Article 79(3), I have always been more intrigued by Article 80 of
the Basic Law and the tight controls it imposes on the regulatory activity of the administrative
state and by a number of decisions vigorously defending the property rights proteced by Article
14(1) against excessive taxation.35
32 See Collins (2015). After the end of the war, there was a parallel renewal of interest in Natural Law among
German jurists and a rejection, by many, of the strict positivist positions of Kelsen and his followers. The
conversion of Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) from the Weimar Republic’s positivism to the Federal Republic’s
iusnaturalism is a transparent example (see Radbruch, 2003). The analysis of this renewal is, unfortunately,
beyond the scope of this paper.
33 The ocial translation of the Basic Law into English can be found at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf
34 The Federal Constitutional Court, in its decisions, has added mentions of justice and moral law (see Kommers
and Miller, 2012, loc. 1500). Article 146 of the Grundgesetz establishes, nevertheless, that the Basic Law,
which despite its nearly 70 years of life was conceived as a transitory text never approved by a plebiscite,
“shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes eect.”
Could this new constitution eliminate the eternity clause or the principles protected by it?
35 See, for example, the decision of June 22, 1995, BVerfG-Beschlu(2 BvL 37/91) BStBl. 1995 II S. 655, limiting
the total amount of taxation that a person could endure from an income and a wealth tax to 50 percent of
income (I am skipping a number of nuances in the decision). A significative choice was to locate the Federal
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, a mid-size town in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, far away from the centers of
political and economic power in Germany. One has the suspicion that our own Supreme Court is unduly
influenced by Washington’s life. I often wonder whether a Supreme Court Justice located in Omaha or Des
Moines would not be interested more in constitutional matters and less in the opinion pages of the New York
Times or in keeping a good standing in the cocktail party circuit of Georgetown.
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Furthermore, the ideas of ordoliberalism, a movement that integrated jurists and economists,
became mainstream in Germany. Ordoliberalism emphasizes rules and the importance of fol-
lowing constitutional arrangements, both in law and in economic policy.36 Even the whole
European Union project, with its view of integrating economies through law and rules but
always respecting fundamental rights, is a peculiar proof of this renewed thick interpretation.
Perhaps these factors explain why, among all major continental European countries, Ger-
many is still the most market-friendly economy, why Germany has defended (although often
more in words than in deeds) the strong adherence to rules as the only way forward in managing
the euro crisis, and why the Federal Constitutional Court has been the only entity in the whole
of Europe that has dared to ask where the Union is going in terms of the “rule of law.”
None of the previous observations are motives for undue celebration: limited government is
on retreat all over Europe. Even stating that rules may be better than discretion while conduct-
ing monetary policy has become a sign of eccentricity (if done under the guise of respectable
academic language) or pure madness (if more direct words are preferred). But they are, at
least, a sign that the “rule of law” can work, even in a country with such a troubled history as
Germany.
8 Concluding Remarks
I started this paper quoting Theodore Plucknett. It seems a proper Wagnerian leitmotif to
return to the English historian for our conclusion:
the mediaeval man was above all a man of action, and out of the night of the dark
ages he began to build the fabric of law. To him the rule of law was not only a
worthy achievement of the spirit, but also a great active crusade, and the greatest
of all the crusades, because it alone survived its defeats.
36 Many of first-generation ordoliberals, such as Franz Bo¨hm (1895-1977), Walter Eucken (1891-1950), and
Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977). were associated with the Freiburg School. Others, such as Wilhelm Ro¨pke
(1899-1966) and Alexander Ro¨stow (1885-1963), were more independent. There are deep anities between
ordoliberals and James Buchanan’s project of constitutional economics. See Buchanan (1986).
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Nowadays, it is fashionable to write monographs exploring the rise of the West versus the
rest. The list of theories accounting for the great divergence is large: from imperialism and the
plundering of natural resources (from one side of the aisle) to superior institutions (on the other
side). However, even among those defending the role of institutions, there is little appreciation
of the pivotal role played by law in European development.
Ningzong, the Chinese emperor in 1215, was secure in his large kingdom and had ample
sources of revenue. He had numerous counselors and he regularly asked for their advice, but he
would never need to call representatives of his realm and request their approval to raise taxes
or engage in war. Simply put: he would have not even understood what a charter such as
Magna Carta was. In comparison, John of England and the other European territorial rulers
had to deal with parliaments, lawyers, the Catholic Church, the nobility, and self-governing
cities. And as the success of Magna Carta shows, these counterbalancing powers often won. In
China, there was never anything remotely similar to parliaments, law was not conceptualized
as an autonomous area, there was no independent and organized religious organization (the
Buddhist temples were far from being a coordinated source of power), the nobility had been
largely replaced by a cadre of civil servants selected by an examination system, and cities existed
only to the extent that the emperor found it advisable.
Magna Carta and its influence on the history of the English-speaking nations is overwhelming
evidence that Europe was dierent. As Plucknett reminds us, the Middle Ages changed the
course of European history and Europe’s oshoots in North America and Oceania forever. The
supremacy of the law was the secret weapon of Europeans.
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9 Appendix
This appendix expands some collateral discussions in the paper that I find of interest, but that
space constraints preclude me from incorporating into the main text.
9.1 Examples of Dierent Interpretations of the Rule of Law
In the main text, I briefly quoted a famous essay by Joseph Raz (1979). It is worthwhile to
quote him more extensively to fully understand the nuances of his formalist interpretation of
the “rule of law.”
First, Raz describes how, in his view, the “rule of law” is a formal requirement:
This is the basic intuition from which the doctrine of the rule of law derives: the
law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. It is evident that this
conception of the rule of law is a formal one.
Second, he highlights the absence of substantive requirements, either regarding how laws
are created or their content:
It says nothing about how the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic majorities,
or any other way. It says nothing about fundamental rights, about equality, or
justice.
Third, Raz argues that these formal requirements are, nevertheless, fundamental:
The rule of law is essentially a negative value. The law inevitably creates a great
danger of arbitrary powerthe rule of law is designed to minimize the danger created
by the law itself. Similarly, the law may be unstable, obscure, retrospective, etc.,
and thus infringe people’s freedom and dignity. The rule of law is designed to
prevent this danger as well. Thus the rule of law is a negative virtue in two senses:
conformity to it does not cause good except through avoiding evil and the evil which
is avoided is evil which could only have been caused by the law itself.
Finally, Raz defends his separation between the “rule of law” as a technical set of conditions
and other values allows the use of the law to achieve other social goals:
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In considering the relation between the rule of law and other values the law should
serve, it is of particular importance to remember that the rule of law is essentially a
negative value. It is merely designed to minimize the harm to freedom and dignity
which the law may cause in its pursuit of its goals however laudable these may
be. Finally, regarding the rule of law as the inherent excellence of the law means
that it fulfils essentially a subservient role. Conformity to it makes the law a good
instrument for achieving certain goals, but conformity to the rule of law is not itself
an ultimate goal. This subservient role of the doctrine shows both its power and its
limitations. On the one hand, if the pursuit of certain goals is entirely incompatible
with the rule of law, then these goals should not be pursued by legal means. But
on the other hand one should be wary of disqualifying the legal pursuit of major
social goals in the name of the rule of law. After all, the rule of law is meant to
enable the law to promote social good, and should not be lightly used to show that
it should not do so. Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law
may make the law barren and empty.
As I explain in section 6 of the main text, the “legal pursuit of major social goals” is
a treacherous activity, which often shows itself to be ultimately incompatible with even the
formalist requirements of the thin interpretation.
I picked Raz as an example of a scholar defending the thin interpretation of the “rule of law”
not only for the clarity of his exposition but also because he is the dean of modern positivism.
But formalist views of the “rule of law” are common even among those with strict iusnaturalist
inclinations. For example, in his celebrated Natural Law and Natural Rights, John Finnis lists
eight procedural conditions as the only requirements that a legal system has to satisfy to be
in good “rule of law” standing (Finnis, 2011, pp. 270-271). Among those requirements, Finnis
includes the prospectivity of laws, the clarity and consistency of norms, and accountability in
the compliance with rules.37 In fact, he explains how:
conspirators against the common good will regularly seek to gain and hold power
37 Finnis (2011), p. 274. Finnis’ position is tempered by his belief that the formal conditions he outlines are,
by themselves, suciently powerful to reduce the worst excesses of dictatorships.
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through an adherence to constitutional and legal forms which is not the less ‘scrupu-
lous’ for being tactically motivated, insincere, and temporary.
Among those defending a thick interpretation of the “rule of law,” we find the World Justice
Project, a non-partisan organization that has done much in recent years to defend and measure
the “rule of law” across the world. The World Justice Project includes in its definition of the
“rule of law”:38
The laws ... protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and prop-
erty.
Finally, there are thinkers such as T.R.S. Allan who reject “any rigid distinction between
procedure and substance, as artificial and unworkable” and who prefer to think about the “rule
of law” as “a set of closely interrelated principles that together make up the core of the doctrine
of the theory of constitutionalism” (Allan, 2001). Dealing with Allan’s subtle ideas about the
construction of constitutional orders would require a paper of its own.
9.2 Miscellanea Notes on A.V. Dicey
9.2.1 On the Success of the “Rule of Law” Expression
Several reasons account for the tremendous success of Dicey’s use of the expression “rule of
law.” First, he was the Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford. Even if the Chair had lost much
of its intellectual luster after Blackstone retired, Dicey got it at the right moment: Oxford Law
school was rejuvenating itself to become one of the prominent legal educational institutions
(Lawson, 1968). The Vinerian professorship gave him an extraordinary platform from which
to leverage his ideas. Second, the Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution is
eminently readable. Third, the treatise perfectly connected with the moderate Whig consensus
prevailing among the intellectual class in England at the time.
38 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law
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9.2.2 A.V. Dicey and the U.S.
Often, Dicey’s visit to the U.S. in 1870 and the influence of his constitutional thinking are
not discussed in sucient detail: not only did Dicey experience first hand the constitutional
arrangements of North America, but he befriended American jurists such as Oliver W. Holmes.
Furthermore, there is a clear parallelism between Dicey and von Mohl (the popularizer of the
idea of the constitutional state; see subsection 9.7 below): both were exposed early in their
careers to the U.S. experiment on constitutional government and theorized about what was
already established practice in North America.
9.2.3 On the Relation between Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Law
Dicey’s relation between his two stated principles of the British constitution, parliamentary
sovereignty and the “rule of Law,” deserves a more nuanced elaboration, which I can only
sketch even in an appendix.
The key component of such an investigation is chapter XIII of the Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution, aptly called “Relation between Parliamentary Sovereignty and the
Rule of Law.” The chapter starts, appropriately, by recognizing the potential conflict between
Parliament and the “rule of law.”
Dicey was, politically, a strong supporter of parliamentary sovereignty and, methodologi-
cally, of John Austin’s positivist program. These two considerations led him to believe that
Westminster could pass an act with little regard to morality. However, Dicey thought this
course of action was unlikely. The structural features of the British political system (the coun-
terbalancing forces of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons and the lack
of direct executive power) were such that, far from contradicting the “rule of law,” they actually
reinforced it. The House of Commons, for example, was always reluctant to limit individual
freedoms that could be used against their members’ constituencies and the peers of the House
of Lords were jealous guardians of property rights.
Nevertheless, Dicey did not fully deny the tension existing between the two principles (a
tension that, as I discuss in subsection 9.5 below, has its origins in the desire of the 17th cen-
tury Whigs to defend the achievements of 1688 against royal encroachments). The Vinerian
professor was concerned that continental European assemblies did not share the same structural
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features as the British parliament and, having come to power in very dierent historical cir-
cumstances, were also less inclined to protect individual liberties. Even in the United Kingdom,
Dicey witnessed the showdown between the House of Lords and Lloyd George’s 1911 People’s
Budget, which ended with the resounding defeat of the peers of the realm by the cunning Welsh
politician.
A more modern argument is to think about the “rule of law” as a contingent choice of a
sovereign British parliament. Parliament could choose to abolish it, but it does not do so (and
Dicey would have defended it was proper from a moral, but not necessarily legal, stance). Thus,
as long as Parliament continued such a policy, the “rule of law” reigned in the United Kingdom
and he had to include it as a principle of the constitution.
9.3 The Rule of Law and the American Founding
In the main text, I spend some time discussing earlier colonial times. I avoided further discussion
of later documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, as they involve topics, such as
natural rights, that sit somewhat uneasily with the tradition of the common law, Bracton, and
Coke that I highlight in the main text.
But many other instances would deserve more elaboration if space was available. For exam-
ple, James Otis, in his 1764 pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,
claimed -echoing Coke’s views on Dr. Bonham’s case- that:
Parliaments are in all cases to declare what is good for the whole; but it is not
the declaration of parliament that makes it so. There must be in every instance a
higher authority-God. Should an act of parliament be against any of His natural
laws, which are immutably true, their declaration would be contrary to eternal truth,
equity and justice, and consequently void.
One could argue, even, that the Declaration of Independence shows, by presenting a theory
of the origins and goal of government, a thick understanding of the “rule of Law.” Quoting the
second paragraph:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
29
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,
–That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to eect their Safety and Happiness.
It is worthwhile to re-read these well-known words. The first sentence tells us that, for our
Founding Fathers, the existence of rights for all persons was “self-evident.” The second sentence
tells us that legal systems (“Governments”) are legitimate only when they respect individual
rights. The third sentence is the most radical: when “any Form of Government” becomes
incompatible with these rights, it is the right of “the People” to create a new legal system. In
other words, the American Founding conceived the rule of law as the supremacy of norms that
allow “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
9.4 A Note on Hitler’s Polycracy
Broszat’s 1981 monograph that I cite in the main text demolished the older view, common
in the English-speaking world, of a monolithic national-socialist state. This image was more
the product of Joseph Goebbels’ success as an evil propagandist than of thorough historio-
graphic study (although acute contemporaries, such as Neumann, 2009, had already observed
this pattern by the early 1940s).
Hitler created this polycracy partly because his capricious nature lacked any interest in daily
managerial activities (the last meeting of his cabinet was on February 4, 1938!), partly as a way
to make his subordinates fight each other. This struggle played a triple purpose.
First, by pitting the national-socialist leaders against one another, Hitler precluded the rise
any of them as an eective rival. Second, because of his social Darwinian Weltanschauung, he
believed that the person who could survive bureaucratic infights was the kind of leader Germany
required. Third, because it isolated Hitler from unpopular policies undertaken by his associates.
Ian Kershaw, the most celebrated of Broszat’s student, called historians’ attention to the
expression “working towards the Fu¨hrer” used by Wener Willikens, the State Secretary in
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the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture (Kershaw, 1993). “Working towards the Fu¨hrer” meant
that civil servants should take the initiative in acting in ways Hitler “intends to realise sooner
or later” and be sure that they would realize “sudden legal confirmation of his work.” This
principle created, nevertheless, a dynamic regime with an inherent tendency toward increased
radicalization, as civil servants struggled to outdo each other in guessing the Fu¨hrer’s preferences
toward an evermore aggressive policy.
9.5 A Note on Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Colonies
In the main text, I discuss how the key issue behind American independence was the extent
of parliamentary power in the American colonies. The colonial elites understood that parlia-
mentary sovereignty would, sooner or later, encroach on their liberties. On the other hand,
the British leaders were adamant about the need to assert parliamentary sovereignty, not only
among the moderate Lord North’s supporters but also, but even more so, among the opposition
Rockingham Whigs (see Reid, 1991, for a careful documentation). A set of rich and growing
American colonies directly linked to the Crown without passing through Westminster was a
potential source of revenue and power for the King, who could use these resources to undo the
conquests of the Glorious Revolution. This was not a paranoid thought: George III used the
revenue and positions from Ireland (which, at the time, still had its own parliament) precisely
for that purpose.39 Also, the Whigs had witnessed with horror the reassertion of royal power
in Sweden in 1772 against the Riksdag of the Estates. At the end of the day, the British
elites decided they would rather lose the colonies than engender a revival of the monarchy’s
prerogatives.
Both Reid (1991) and Shain (2015) have defended that one can interpret the American
Revolution as a “backward movement”: a desire of the colonials to go back to the ancient
English constitution in opposition to 17th century developments. In that sense, one could
argue that Magna Carta lives more in the current constitutional order of the United States
39 One could even imagine a British king moving the court to Philadelphia if the American colonies, after a
few additional decades of population growth and prosperity, had become the dominant force in the Empire.
This is not an outrageous possibility: the Portuguese prince regent moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. Even if
Joa˜o VI was reacting to the Napoleonic invasion, another conflict or confluence of events may have induced
a later Hanoverian king to move the court of St. James.
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than in the United Kingdom, despite the nationalistic overtones of the celebrations on the
east side of the Atlantic Ocean. Reid’s and Shain’s interpretation, however, downplays some
of the more radical implications of colonial thought and of the dynamism of the language of
natural rights that became widespread among many writers in the new United States.40 For
this alternative, more radical tradition, see Yirush (2011).
9.6 A Note on Magna Carta and American Pageantry
Magna Carta also prominently appears in colonial pageantry. In a popular but not too subtle
engraving from 1768, John Dickinson, author of Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, appears
holding a manuscript of his book while resting on a volume entitled Magna Carta. In an even
less subtle reference, the 1775 seal of the colony of Massachusetts displays a free citizen holding a
copy ofMagna Carta in one hand and a sword in the other. Fisher (2004) provides a fascinating
record of the visual images of the American founding.
9.7 A Note on the History of the Rechtsstaat
As I explained in the main text, the word Rechtsstaat was invented in 1798 by J.W. Petersen
(1758-1815). Petersen, in a stroke of rhetorical genius, opposed the defenders of a constitutional
state (Rechts-Staats-Lehrer) with the defenders of the law of the state (Staats-Rechts-Lehrer).
This was a transparent dierentiation between what I have called in the main text the “rule by
norms” and the “rule of law.”
A concise yet penetrating exposition of the idea of the Rechtsstaat and its historical evolution
appears in Bo¨ckenfo¨rde (1991).41 In this history, it is interesting to remember that von Mohl,
the great popularizer of the term Rechtsstaat, published the first learned commentary on the
U.S. constitution in Germany (Mohl 1824). Mohl was also familiar with Joseph Story’s and
James Kent’s work and commented on them for the German public. The influence between
40 Although one could argue that the use of the natural rights language was the only option available once the
defense of the “liberties of the English” was rhetorically impossible after the Declaration of Independece.
41 Both as a legal philosopher and as a former judge of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Ernst-
Wolfgang Bo¨ckenfo¨rde has made fundamental contributions to the idea of the “rule of law” and limited
government. Bo¨ckenfo¨rde’s insights are sadly underappreciated in the U.S.
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U.S. and German legal thought is a two-way street.
In the main text, I summarized how the original idea of the Rechtsstaat was devoid of ma-
terial content by legal theorists from around 1848 to 1914. During the interwar years and,
in particular, after World War II, a reaction in Germany aimed to add back not only the
traditional liberal contents, but also democratic (i.e., political rights) and social considera-
tions (i.e.. the welfare state). For example, in Article 28(1), the Grundgesetz requires the
basic laws of the La¨nder to create republican, democratic, and social constitutional states
(Die verfassungsma¨ßige Ordnung in den La¨ndern muß den Grundsa¨tzen des republikanischen,
demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates).42 One could think about the democratic and social
constitutional state as the thickest interpretation of the “rule of law.”
Interestingly enough, this was the only time the original text of the Grundgesetz explicitly
used the expression Rechtsstaat as a principle of the Federation. Two later amendments added
references to rechtsstaatliche (the actual existence of “rule of law” or of a constitutional state).43
In 1992, Article 22 was modified to include the constitutional state as part of the European
Union goals under which the Federal Republic could participate in the integration project. In
2009, Article 16 was changed to allow the extradition of a German citizen to another European
Union country or to an international court as long as the “rule of law” is satisfied.
The memory of 1933-1945 also explains why Germany insists on calling the former Demo-
cratic Republic an Unrechtsstaat, an “unconstitutional state,” without any legitimacy and with-
out any real base of support beyond the soviet ballonets.
9.8 Rechtsstaat v. the “Rule of Law”
Rechtsstaat is translated into the romance languages as some variation of “state of law” (Civitas
in legibus posita in Latin, l’Etat de droit in French, Estado de derecho in Spanish, Stato di diritto
in Italian). In the French legal tradition, there is a useful distinction due to Carre´ de Malberg
(1861-1935) between l’Etat le´gal (the legal state) and the l’Etat de droit (the constitutional
42 The terminology social constitutional state is due to Hermann Heller (1891-1933); see Heller (1930).
43 This expression also encompasses content such as the German equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s strict
scrutiny, the principle of proportionality, and the application of equity principles in cases of hardship. See
Sobota (1997) for details
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state), which makes clear the dierence between a formalist and a substantive interpretation of
the “rule of law.”
An interesting case happened in South Africa: after the fall of apartheid, the first provisional
constitution talked about the constitutional state, but the final constitution switched to the
“rule of law.” The switch raised a number of interesting questions of interpretation (see Venter,
2012).
Even if in my native Spanish, “Estado de derecho” (or “Estado social y democra´tico de
derecho” as proclaimed in Article 1 of the 1978 Spanish constitution) is the default expression,
I have always been fonder of the “rule of law.” The English formulation (imperio de la ley in
Spanish) captures better the idea of law as the foundation of well-ordered liberty, independently
of whether the law is created by a government or is the product of a spontaneous order. Roman
law triumphed in medieval Europe without the support (and often against the opposition)
of territorial sovereigns (Berman, 1983). The idea of the Rechtsstaat cannot handle these
phenomena.
9.9 Hayek and the Rule of Law
As I mentioned in the main text, Hayek hold a formalist view of the “rule of law” in his early
work. However, Bruno Leoni’s influence on Hayek’s view on what law is and how it evolves
was so deep that there are few traces left of this formalism in Hayek’s later work (compare
Leoni, 1991, with Hayek, 2012). In Hayek’s defense, he stated in The Constitution of Liberty
his belief that the procedural requirements embodied in the “rule of law” went a long way to
ensure freedom.
9.10 A Note on the Enabling Act and the Weimar’s Republic Con-
stitution
The Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 was ocially known as the Law to Remedy the Distress of
the People and the Reich (Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich). For all practical
purposes, it gave unlimited power to the German Chancellor and it avoided the need to formally
scrap the Weimar Republic’s Constitution, which was still theoretically on the statute books in
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1945.
While it is often argued that the Enabling Act shows that the legal path toward a dicta-
torship is open within democracies, the actual facts are more nuanced. The elections of March
5, 1933, had occurred under widespread, state-sanctioned violence and terror against left-wing
parties (Ernst Tha¨mann and the rest of the KPD leadership had been arrested, the leadership
of the SPD was in exile in Prague, and on the day of the election, SS, SA, and Stahlhelm
members menacingly monitored the voting stations as auxiliary police to “nudge” voters in the
national direction). Despite these unacceptable conditions, the socialist and communist parties
managed to elect 201 seats, only 15 short of the seats required to block the Enabling Act even
without the support of any of the centrist parties. Given the results of the previous election,
held under much fairer conditions on November 6, 1932, there is little doubt that the left-wing
parties would have obtained enough votes to prevent the passing of the Enabling Act if the
March election had been held even with a modicum of impartiality.
More interesting, from the perspective of the “rule of law,” is Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution, which allowed the president to pass emergency decrees authorizing the use of force
and the suspension of fundamental rights without the approval of the Reichstag. Carl Schmitt
(2004), with his disturbing legal prowess, used Article 48 to probe the limits of the concepts of
sovereignty and rights more deeply than nearly all other thinkers of the 20th century. See also
Vinx (2015) for Carl Schmitt’s debate with Hans Kelsen about the limits of constitutional law
and presidential dictatorship.
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